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Via di Torre Tonda, 34 - 07100 Sassari 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper draws on institutional and evolutionary economics and contributes to an approach 
to environmental policy which diverges from mainstream prescriptions. The 'socio-technical 
system' is the core concept: this is a complex made of co-evolving institutions, technologies, 
markets and actors that fulfils an overall societal need (such as housing, production, mobility, 
etc.). A systemic and dynamic analysis of those structural changes which are needed to create 
more sustainable socio-technical systems is provided; actors – and their ability to influence 
politics and policy – are explicitly taken into consideration. Unsustainable socio-technical 
systems feature a relevant resistance to change, because they are embedded in the very 
structure of our society and because of the conservative action of dominant stakeholders; this 
is why no environmental policy will be effective unless it aims at 'unlocking' our societies 
from their dominance. But also a constructive side of environmental policy is needed in order 
to establish new and more sustainable socio-technical systems; consistently, environmental 
policy is viewed as a combination of actions that can trigger, make viable and align those 
institutional, technological and economic changes which are needed to reach sustainability. 
Again, actors (for change) are at the heart of this vision of environmental policy: as subject, 
because the creation of new and sustainable socio-technical systems is made possible by 
(coalitions of) actors for change; as object, because environmental policy – to be effective – 
must actively support the empowerment, legitimation and social networking of such 
coalitions. A ‘chicken and egg’ problem remains: who comes first? Actors for change 
advocating policies for sustainability or policies for sustainability supporting actors for 
change?  
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1. The quest for a systemic and dynamic approach to sustainability1 
 
 
Most of our needs – in terms of food, housing, energy, mobility, etc. – are fulfilled by 
systems which have proved to be environmentally unsustainable. Such systems feature two 
relevant characteristics which should be seriously taken into consideration when aiming at the 
ambitious goals of curbing greenhouse gas emissions and reducing all other environmental 
impacts of human activities. First characteristic: these systems are embedded in the very 
structure of our society. Behind each good and service we produce and consume every day 
one can find several interconnected elements: individuals, values, regulations, infrastructures, 
organizations, and so forth. Thus the functioning of these systems involves all dimensions 
(cultural, institutional, technological, and economic) of social life. Any attempt at 
reductionism (for example to the technological or economic dimension) is bound to fail. 
Second characteristic: these systems generate change in unpredictable ways. Their dynamics 
is made possible by the action of individuals, which generate causal sequences involving the 
change of many constituents of the system itself, thus conditioning the future action of 
individuals. This is why intentional action co-exists with unintended effects. In this context, 
no rational choice between given alternatives is possible ex-ante: alternatives are created – if 
they are – through action. If we keep in mind these two characteristics of systems, we realize 
that an effective approach to sustainability must be: 1) systemic, that is, able to 
simultaneously consider all dimensions of change, not only technologies or markets, but also 
rules, behavior, policies, etc.; 2) dynamic, that is, able to make change viable, by assuring the 
alignment of all new elements as they are created. 
Standard environmental economics does not help to build an effective approach to 
sustainability precisely because it is not systemic, nor dynamic.2 In the standard approach all 
non-market variables (rules, technologies, preferences, etc.) are exogenous and there is no 
room for purposefulness and uncertainty. Even when institutions are explicitly considered – 
as in the new institutional economics – they still depend on exogenous variables (preferences, 
powers, etc.) and on market-based transaction costs. All this means that sustainability is 
conceived without analytically considering a genuinely systemic and dynamic process of 
change. It is therefore not a surprise that standard environmental policy – whether it makes 
use of green taxes, tradable emission permits or new environmental markets – is nothing but 
an attempt to correct failures in the competitive mechanism and to restore market equilibria. 
Summing up: standard environmental economics is market-centered (that is, not systemic) 
and static (that, is not dynamic); for these reasons it is not adequate as a positive nor as a 
normative theory of sustainability. 
So we come to the second founding idea – and main heuristic – of this paper: in order to build 
a systemic and dynamic approach to sustainability, one should look at other streams of 
economic theory, that is, to (classic) institutional economics and evolutionary economics.3 
                                                 
1
  This paper will be published as a chapter of the forthcoming book: G. Marletto (ed.), Creating a 
sustainable economy. An institutional and evolutionary approach to environmental policy, Routledge. 
2  Throughout this paper ‘standard’, ‘mainstream’, ‘orthodox’, etc. are considered as synonymous. To 
understand what is meant by ‘standard environmental economics’ is sufficient to refer to the more diffused 
handbooks such as the classical Baumol and Oates (1988) or the much more recent Callan and Thomas (2010).  
3  Institutional economics is sometimes called ‘classic’ or ‘old’ institutional economics to avoid any 
confusion with the ‘new’ institutional economics of Coase, Williamson and others; here we will simply call it 
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Evolutionary and institutional economists have diffusely argued that a market-centered and 
static approach – precisely because of its conceptual limits – is inappropriate to represent 
change at a societal level. At the same time they have demonstrated the ability to manage the 
analysis of complex socio-economic systems, and of all that follows in terms of out-of-
equilibrium processes, irreversibility, strong uncertainty, bounded rationality, etc. (Nelson 
and Winter 1982; Witt 1992; Hodgson 1993; Amendola and Gaffard 1998; Arthur 1999; 
North 2005; Metcalfe and Ramlogan 2006). These considerations have been applied to 
environmental matters too: unsustainability is nothing but the result of multiple societal lock-
ins in high-carbon systems, and environmental policies take the form of intentional actions 
aimed at triggering systemic change and making the creation of low-carbon systems viable 
(Unruh 2002; Rammel and van den Bergh 2003; Nill and Kemp 2009). Power – nearly a 
missing issue in standard environmental economics – is centre stage in this approach: both 
because powerful actors are interested in the reproduction of existing unsustainable systems, 
and because institutions must be designed which ease collective action and overcome every 
resistance to change towards sustainability (Ostrom 1990).4 
While a deeper analysis of how institutional and evolutionary economics consider 
environmental issues can be found in the relevant literature (Hodgson 2000; van den Bergh 
and Gowdy 2000; Vatn 2005), the rest of this paper is mainly aimed at sketching an 
institutional and evolutionary framework of economic change, which might be useful as a 
conceptual basis to design and implement effective policies for sustainability. In particular: 
the next two paragraphs consider how economic change is treated by institutional and 
evolutionary economics, respectively; the following paragraph draws on institutional and 
evolutionary basic concepts (uncertainty, lock-in, structured action, coevolution, group 
selection, etc.) and goes into the details of a framework of economic change; the last 
paragraph concludes and provides some hints for an institutional and evolutionary approach 
to environmental policy. 
 
 
 
2. Institutional economics and change 
 
 
Institutional economics dates back to the contributions of Thorstein Veblen, John Commons 
and other scholars, and it is today experiencing a revival, mainly due to Douglas North's 
studies (Vanderberg 2002; Hodgson 2004; Vatn 2005); a revival which was definitively set 
out by the 2005 birth of the Cambridge Journal of Institutional Economics. In this theoretical 
approach, studying the processes of institutional conservation, innovation and change is 
crucial to understanding the functioning of the economy.5 Institutions – that is, systems of 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘institutional economics’. This terminological issue is further complicated by the fact that it is under dispute if 
Douglas North is an institutional or new institutional scholar; I agree with those who consider his work as a 
theoretical evolution from the latter to the former (e.g.: Zweynert 2009). 
4  Elinor Ostrom is not an economist, but a political scientist. More exactly, she is one of those  scholars 
of environmental issues who have drawn concepts and inspiration from institutional economics. The fact that 
she won the 2009 Nobel Prize in economics indicates that criticisms to orthodoxy are more shared than one may 
think. 
5
 For a recent comparison of theories of institutional change, see Kingston and Caballero (2009). 
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rules – are not exogenous, nor do they derive from the market: institutions coevolve with 
other endogenous variables (such as values, individual preferences, power relationships, 
technologies, and so forth) and the market is just one institution among others (Hodgson 
2000). Moreover, ‘markets and other economic institutions do more than allocate goods and 
services: they also influence the evolution of values, tastes, and personalities’ (Bowles 1998: 
75). 
Institutional economists deeply and thoroughly criticize the spontaneous order and market 
failure metaphors that are at the heart of standard environmental economics (Bromley 2007). 
In particular, the very weak (if not illogical) conceptual foundations of the standard treatment 
of both environmental externalities and internalization policies are stressed.6 William Kapp, 
with his book The Social Cost of Private Business (1978), paved the way to a multifaceted 
interest of institutional economics in many other environmental themes7; among these, one 
deserves more attention: environmental governance, that is, ‘the establishment, maintenance 
and change of institutions to foster coordination and resolving conflicts over environmental 
resources’ (Vatn 2009: pp. 61-62). Several scholars have contributed to the understanding of 
this issue and the resulting research stream has provided a positive and normative approach to 
the regulation of the access to – and use of – environmental resources which goes far beyond 
Hardin's still so influential ‘tragedy of the commons’ (McCay 2002; Vatn 2005; Paavola 
2007).8 A relevant corollary of this approach is the design – and experimentation – of 
participative procedures on environmental issues (Stag, 2007): these procedures are explicitly 
based on a criticism of the standard metaphor of the selfish ‘economic man’ and accordingly 
give room to ethical values as a basis for deliberation, learning and decision.9 
But what is more relevant here is to understand how institutional economics has contributed 
to the analysis of change, and above all, of economic change. To accomplish this task I will 
mostly refer to the 2005 Douglas North's book: Understanding the Process of Economic 
Change. The starting point of this book is that ‘the economic paradigm – neo-classical theory 
– was not created to explain the process of economic change’ (ibid.: vii); the ending point is 
not a consistent theory of economic change, but rather the humble acknowledgement that 
human societies are continuously conditioned by uncertainty and exposed to the risk of 
sclerosis. This is why North's final suggestion to ensure the progress of mankind is adaptive 
efficiency, that is, ‘an ongoing condition in which the society continues to modify or create 
new institutions as problems evolve’ (ibid.: 169). North's approach to the analysis of 
economic change is genuinely dynamic: uncertainty is not an exception; on the contrary, it is 
                                                 
6
 For more details and references on the criticisms to standard environmental economics, see Marletto 
(2009). 
7
 For a recent contribution to understand William Kapp's thought, see his posthumous book, edited by 
Berger and Steppacher (2011). 
8
 Once and for all it should be acknowledged what Hardin wrote thirty years after his seminal paper: ‘To 
judge from the critical literature, the weightiest mistake in my synthesizing paper was the omission of the 
modifying adjective “unmanaged”. In correcting this omission, one can generalize the practical conclusion in 
this way: A “managed commons” describes either socialism or the privatism of free enterprise. Either one may 
work; either one may fail: “The devil is in the details” But with an unmanaged commons, you can forget about 
the devil: As overuse of resources reduces carrying capacity, ruin is inevitable. With this modification firmly in 
place, “The Tragedy of the Commons” is well tailored for further interdisciplinary syntheses’ (Hardin 1998: p. 
683). 
9
 The debate on the conceptual foundations of standard welfare economics has generated an almost 
infinite literature; for an updated analysis and reference and for the introduction of moral motivation as a key 
component of environmental policy, see Hodgson (forthcoming). 
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one of the permanent features of the environment where humans act. Taking stock of Herbert 
Simon's theory on bounded rationality, North explicitly considers institutions as social rules 
that have been devised just to take decisions in an uncertain world. But North goes further: 
institutions are based on beliefs – that are both a positive and normative model of the very 
structure of the society; but also this very structure may change. In other words, the world is 
more than uncertain, it is non-ergodic; thus there is no other solution than the continuous 
implementation of a collective evolutionary process of trial, error and learning. North's 
representation of economic change explicitly incorporates the notion of path-dependence, not 
only in the sense of new choices being constrained by what (culture, cognitive patterns, 
beliefs, institutions, etc.) is inherited from the past, but also as the result of the intentional 
conservative action of organizations which are linked to existing institutions; in North's 
words: ‘We may well know a lot about how to make adaptable, efficient institutions; but if 
the people making political and economic decisions […] think that it would threaten their 
survival, they are not going to change’ (North 2003: 8). 
A relevant add-on to the Northian vision comes from the explicit consideration of the link 
between culture, interests and strategic action: ‘In societies in which cultural factors seem to 
hamper economics and/or political development, it is important to “un-lock” cultural legacies 
by making them the object of public debate’ (Zweynert, 2009, P. 57). In such a vision, the 
uneven distribution of power among individuals and groups is a potential source of societal 
lock-in; this is why North considers democracy as a collective process which is continuously 
open to innovation, thus creating the conditions for further progress. The core concept of 
societal lock-in is shared by many scholars of environmental issues; among the others: 
Gregory Unruh, who in 2000 and 2002 published two seminal papers on understanding and 
escaping ‘carbon lock-in’, and Timothy Foxon, whose work is mainly dedicated to the 
analysis of the ‘coevolution of ecosystems, technologies, institutions, business strategies and 
user practices’ (Foxon, 2011, p. 2258), which is at the heart of the transition process from 
high- to low-carbon societies. Foxon also refers to Pierson (2000) to show that North's core 
concepts of social path-dependence and lock-in have gained a foothold in political science 
too. The crossing of this disciplinary border is consistent with the long-lasting debate on 
transitions, policies and politics (Shove and Walker 2007; Genus and Coles 2008; Voss et al. 
2009; Frantzeskaki and de Haan 2011; Meadowcroft 2011) such a debate signals that the 
political and power dimension of transitions should not be neglected, as the creation and 
diffusion of sustainable novelties is the result of a ‘battle over institutions’ between opposing 
coalitions: those defending the status quo and the others who advocate innovation (Walker 
2000; Jacobsson and Lauber 2006; Sovacool 2008). James Meadowcroft goes further in 
stressing the political dimension of transitions: ‘Transition management can contribute to the 
process by opening out the decision space, establishing new coalition of actors, and 
encouraging societal learning about various alternative. (…) But once it comes time to 
commit large scale public resources to particular technologies, or to tilt regulatory or political 
frameworks to favor particular approaches, it is to be expected that issues will be trashed out 
through broader societal debate and resolved by established political mechanisms’ 
(Meadowcroft 2009, p. 337). 
All these arguments imply that change – and the relation between institutions and change – 
cannot be understood without an explicit conceptualization of power (Avelino and Rotmans 
2009; Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2010). Moreover, what emerges from all the 
contributions is a representation of change as resulting from the coevolution of cultures, 
institutions and organizations, with the structured action of powerful individuals and groups 
playing a driving role. Inter alia, this means that time has come to get a better understanding 
of the specific contribution of evolutionary economics to the analysis of societal change 
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3. Evolutionary economics and change 
 
 
Evolutionary economics mainly derives from the idea that – at a high level of abstraction – 
Darwinian principles may cover both natural and social domains (Hodgson and Knudsen 
2010).10 This is not the place to enter the interesting debate on generalized Darwinism; but 
there is one point that must be stressed ab initio: Darwinian principles – and, in particular, the 
mechanism of self-organization – are consistent with human choice. In complex evolutionary 
systems, intentional action co-exists with unintended (and sometimes unwanted) effects 
(Hodgson and Knudsen 2006). Purposefulness is not finalism. The fundamental mechanisms 
of Darwinian evolution – variation, selection and inheritance – are at the heart of several 
different economic research streams; among the many, just to indicate the most important 
fields of investigation: technological innovations (Freeman and Pavitt 2002), models of 
capitalism (Aoki 2001), behavior (Manner and Gowdy 2010; Bowles and Gintis 2011). Even 
North's work on history and institutional change may be considered as an application of 
evolutionary thinking to economics.11 Some of these streams have generated a specific 
interest in environmental issues, in particular with reference to ‘green’ innovations (Sartorius 
2006) and the management of the commons (Dietz et al. 2003).12  
Two basic concepts of evolutionary economics are crucial for understanding economic 
change: coevolution and multilevel selection.  
‘Coevolution is the evolution of two or more populations through the action of reciprocal 
selective pressures and adaptation between them’ (Winder et al. 2005: 355); this implies that 
coevolution should not be confused with simple mechanistic interactions, nor with more 
general co-dynamics processes. But, much more relevant here, coevolution generates 
processes of change which feature unpredictability, non-reversibility, non-ergodicity and 
complexity; referring again to the same researchers: “coevolutionary systems are 
evolutionary systems that may run far from equilibrium. (…) Each of the reciprocally linked 
evolutionary sub-systems has the potential to change the selection regime experienced by the 
others. When the selection regime changes, the dynamic rules of interaction change with 
them (…)” (ibid.). More accurately, the concept of equilibrium itself is not analytically 
relevant because ‘Populations do not evolve towards a predetermined system state but in 
response to partly stochastic changes in each other’ (ibid.). A coevolutionary approach has 
been applied to several domains: industries and technologies (Malerba et al. 2005; 
Safarzynska et al. 2011), demand-supply coevolution (e.g., Windrum and Birchenhall 2005), 
behavior and institutions (e.g., Bowles et al. 2003; Hodgson and Knudsen 2004), etc. Even 
the relation between human socio-economic systems and ecosystems can be considered as a 
coevolutionary one; Richard Noorgard is certainly the preeminent scholar of this relevant 
issue: his coevolutionary framework of the interactions between cultural and biotic systems 
probably is the most structured answer to the transdisciplinary claims of ecological 
                                                 
10
  For a stimulating attempt to build a taxonomy of the different approaches to evolutionary economics, 
see Witt (2008). 
11
  Actually North (2005: pp. 65-66) is explicitly fascinated by the evolutionary metaphor – mainly 
because it is able to integrate time and change – but then he diverges from it because, in his opinion, Darwinism 
is not consistent with human intentionality. 
12
  For a review of the actual and potential applications of evolutionary concepts to environmental 
economics, see van den Bergh (2007). 
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economics (Gual and Norgaard 2010; Kallis and Norgaard 2010).13 A coevolutionary 
representation of human-nature systems has also been applied to the management of natural 
resources; Rammel et al. (2007) and Kallis (2010), among others, study the interactions 
between the base of natural resources, the behavior of human agents, the emergence of 
institutions and policies, the developments of technologies, the supply and demand of goods 
and services, and so forth. 
The other crucial concept of an evolutionary representation of economic change is the link 
between multilevel selection and power: multilevel (or group) selection theory of 
evolutionary change involves selection operating at both individual and group levels and 
‘addresses the formation, growth and interactions of groups and offers arguably the best 
available framework for thinking about dynamics within and between groups’ (Safarzynska 
and van den Bergh, 2010, p. 747). Such a theory considers mechanisms which refer to 
individuals, both within a group (conflict, complementarity, cooperation, imitation, etc.) and 
between groups (formation of new groups, entrance into – or exit from – existing groups, 
migration from one group to another, etc.); as well as referring to groups (competition, 
splitting, re-assorting, spatial clustering, etc.). (van den Bergh and Gowdy 2009). The 
mechanisms of multilevel selection may apply to natural and socio-economic domains; here 
we are interested in understanding: the interaction between the mechanisms of ‘cultural’ 
group selection (that is, when individuals are human agents14) and the exercise of power, and 
how this interaction affects economic change. Safarzynska and van den Bergh have recently 
proposed a framework which shows that ‘explaining the relation between power and 
institutional change using a [cultural] group selection approach may provide insight into how 
stable institutions arise, how institutional change can be stimulated or slowed down, and how 
this in turn affects the behavior of individuals’ (Safarzynska and van den Bergh 2010, p. 
749). Even if these considerations on the interaction between individuals, groups, power and 
institutional change may be extended as such to the wider domain of economic change, it is 
worth specifying two issues. First: intentionality, learning and power – however they are 
defined – become attributes of both individual agents and groups; second: individual agents 
may be defined also in terms of (changing) group membership (members or outsiders; leaders 
or followers; first-movers or laggards; etc.). Also crucial to the understanding of the 
interaction between cultural group selection and the exercise of power is the self-reinforcing 
process which links the abilities of a group to increase its material and immaterial 
endowments, to gain higher legitimacy, and to expand its network of relationships (Bergek 
2008a and 2008b). To complete the picture on the issue of cultural group selection, we 
consider the recent contribution of Breslin (2011), where the evolution of individuals and 
groups is analysed also in terms of space; in particular, in terms of divergence between local 
practices and wider changes.  
4. An institutional and evolutionary framework of economic change 
 
4.1. What is specific to this framework  
 
                                                 
13
  But it must be stressed that if the Norgaard's coevolutionary approach definitely shares the field of 
ecological economics, not all ecological economics makes use of a coevolutionary approach to represent human-
nature interactions. See again van den Bergh (2007) on this point. 
14
  Obviously, human population is exposed to the mechanisms of both genetic and cultural group 
selection. 
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Now we begin to build a conceptual framework which relies on the findings emerging from 
institutional and evolutionary economics, in particular from their application to the analysis 
of economic change. Many other scholars have tried to accomplish such a task by referring to 
one of the above streams of heterodox economics, or to the cross-fertilization of both. It goes 
beyond the scope of this chapter to review all these contributions, but we acknowledge that the 
conceptual framework presented here extensively draws on the multi-level perspective (MLP) and on other systemic and dynamic 
approaches to the analysis of economic change15. This paragraph will stress what is specific of our attempt
. 
The first specificity is that our framework is not reductionistic: complexity is explicitly 
considered as a relevant feature of the process of economic change; this is why the overall 
picture is never explained by looking at – or by starting from – one or more specific elements. 
In particular – even if we will repeatedly refer to the literature on technological innovation – 
we will not yield to the temptation of technological reductionism: technology is just a 
structural element of the functioning of the economy which interacts with other institutional 
and economic constituents, and with agency. It is not considered as the core driver of change, 
not even as an analytical ‘entry point’ (Geels 2005). 
Another specificity is that rather than focusing on functions, the model focuses on actions.16 
At the heart of the framework one can find the purposeful action of individuals and groups. 
All relevant attributes which connote action stay at the centre of the analytical scene: power, 
interests, agendas, conflicts, intentional pressure for – and resistance to – change, etc. As 
repeatedly stated above, this does not mean that the framework is deterministic, with 
individual and collective action as the cause and all changes in technologies, markets and 
institutions as the intended effects; it only means that genuinely evolutionary and 
coevolutionary dynamics are made possible by agency: there is no economic change without 
human action. 
A final specificity is that the model considers politics as a crucial issue. Political discourses, 
interactions between political and non-political actors, policy-makers' agendas and – last but 
not least – laws, regulations and policies in force, are all constituents of economic changes 
that should not be ignored. 
In the following, the explanation of most of the concepts will be supported by some examples 
mainly related to urban mobility.17 
 
4.2. Socio-technical systems18 
 
The socio-technical (ST) system is the basic concept of the framework.  
Societal functions (housing, feeding, production, provision of energy, etc.) are fulfilled by 
                                                 
15
  For critical reviews of this research field, see: Geels (2005), Markard and Trufferd (2008), Foxon 
(2011) and van den Bergh et al. (2011). 
16
  The most structured and developed approach to the study of the functions of innovation systems is that 
of Anna Bergek, Staffan Jacobsson and other scholars; see, Bergek et al. (2008a and 2008b) and Jacobsson and 
Bergek (2011).  
17
  For more details on a socio-technical analysis of urban mobility see Kohler et al. (2009) and Marletto 
(2011b). 
18
  The content of this paragraph has been partially revised after a stimulating discussion with Frank 
Geels; I thank him and I take full responsibility of what is written. 
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one or more ST systems. For example, the societal function of urban mobility is fulfilled by 
several ST systems: the internal combustion car, public transport, the bicycle, car sharing, etc. 
All ST systems are (more or less) stable configurations. The ST system is a meso-concept: at 
the micro level we find its individual constituents (rules, artifacts, knowledge, actors, 
preferences, financial resources, etc.); at the macro level (which is considered exogenous) 
socio-economic phenomena and trends can be found.19 The functioning of ST systems can be 
conceptualized as structured agency (Giddens 1984): a structure of three coevolving sub-
systems – that is, institutions, technologies and markets – is replicated and changed through 
individual and collective action and learning, which in turn are enabled and constrained by 
the above structure.20 In other words: the complexity of ST systems is coordinated by its 
structure of coevolving constituents, and it is made possible by adaptive agency.21 Institutions 
are considered here as a coherent and relatively stable set of general rules that (together with 
other structural variables) structure agency; such a set of rules is also called 'ST regime' 
(Geels 2005). Consistently with this definition, each sub-system features a specific set of 
rules, that is, a sub-regime. 
Two more basic concepts complete the framework: 1) the dominant ST system, that is, a 
stable and powerful ST system which strongly influences the dynamics of all other subaltern 
or residual ST systems. A dominant ST system generates pervasive lock-in phenomena;22 2) 
the ST ‘niche’, that is, a space which is partially or totally protected from the interaction with 
other ST systems (Kemp et al. 1998; Schot and Geels 2008).23 ST niches are particularly 
relevant for the generation and experimentation of novelties and for the gradual structuring 
and empowerment of new ST systems (Avelino and Rotmans 2009). For example, still with 
reference to the societal function of urban mobility: the internal combustion car is the 
dominant ST system; public transport is a stable ST system which co-exist with – and is 
subaltern to – the car ST system; the battery electric vehicle is an unstable ST system, located 
in a ST niche. 
 
4.3. Actors and power 
 
As already stressed, (structured) agency is an essential element of the complex dynamics of 
ST systems. Actors – all featuring bounded rationality – are the engine of a coevolutionary 
process of change: through action and learning, they replicate the structure of the ST system, 
whilst generating – directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally – the variation and 
                                                 
19
  This is the ‘landscape’ in the terminology used by Geels (2002) and others scholars who share the 
MLP. 
20
  Similar representations based on the interaction of institutions, technologies and markets – even if 
named differently – can be found in: Perez (2002); Murmann (2003); Geels (2005); Gual and Norgaard (2010).  
21
  For a detailed analysis of the structure of a ST system and the coevolution of its three sub-systems, see 
Marletto (2011a). 
22
  The idea of co-existing – and both relatively stable – dominant and subaltern ST systems fill a 
conceptual void of the MLP. Some scholars use hybrid concepts – such the ‘niche-regime’ or the ‘empowered 
niche’ (Haxeltine et al. 2008; Frantzeskaki and de Han 2009) – which are not satisfying because they still refer 
to the low level of structuring featured by systems located in a niche. Only recently the concepts of dominant 
and subaltern regimes have been introduced by Kemp et al. (forthcoming). 
23
  The Bounded socio-technical experiment (BSTE) is a similar concept (Brown et al. 2003; Brown and 
Vergragt 2008).  
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selection of structural variables. Every actor features a vector of material and immaterial 
endowments (physical and financial resources, knowledge and skills, social capital and 
legitimacy, etc.) and is motivated by his interests, ideas and visions. Every actor's power – 
hence her/his ability to influence the dynamics of ST systems – is a function of the above 
vector. In this framework, power is cumulative; in particular, because increasing power is 
generated by action and learning (Avelino and Rotmans 2009), and because power, 
legitimacy, coalition building and access to resources are linked by a self-reinforcing process 
(Bergek et al. 2008a and 2008b). 
Actors may be individual or collective (that is, groups). The role of collective actors in the 
functioning of ST systems is stressed by the literature, so that some authors explicitly 
consider ST systems as groups (however they are named) and institutions as rules shared by 
that group.24 Actors' membership is then crucial to understand the dynamics and interactions 
of ST systems; in particular: ‘core-actors’ are those actors who are interested in – and 
actively act for – the reproduction of an existing ST system. Core-actors of a dominant ST 
system feature high levels of power, legitimacy and networking ability, and they are able to 
use their endowments to influence institutions, politics and policy; (Smith et al. 2005; 
Avelino and Rotmans 2009); ‘enactors’ are those actors who are interested in the emergence 
and establishment of a new ST system (Suurs et al. 2010).25 Usually starting from a ST niche 
– and through empowerment, legitimation and the creation of an advocacy coalition – 
successful enactors are able to gain an increasing ability to influence informal rules, political 
discourses, agendas and formal norms and policies. For example: the automotive industry is 
one of the core-actors of the car dominant system; local authorities are among the core-actors 
of the public transport system; grassroots movements were among the enactors of the bicycle 
system in many European cities.  
Other kinds of actors may be considered: non-core actors (or ‘fringe’ actors), that is, those 
actors who take part in a ST system without assuming a relevant role in its reproduction and 
outsiders, that is, those actors who are external to a given ST system. It must be stressed that 
both non-core actors and outsiders of a given ST system may be the core-actors of another ST 
system (Smith et al. 2005).  
 
4.4. Actors and change 
 
The dynamics of ST systems may be grouped into two large families: adaptation of existing 
ST systems and the creation of a new ST system.26 Adaptation can be conceptualized as a 
                                                 
24
  For example: Holtz et al. (2008) refer to ‘alignments’ of actors; Avelino and Rotmans (2009) to 
‘constellations’ of actors; Geels (2010) to networks of actors. 
25
  I use the term 'enactor' because I feel it represents effectively an actor who is trying to transform a new 
idea into a social practice. I also think it is more general than the alternative terms, such as: 'social entrepreneur' 
(Brown and Vergragt 2008); 'entrepreneurial actor' (Bergek 2008b); 'cultural entrepreneur' (Zweynert, 2009). 
26
  I refer purposely to the creation of – and not to the transition towards – a new ST system. Indeed I feel 
that the concept of 'transition' – well established in the relevant literature – implicitly refers to two basic ideas 
which are not shared by the framework proposed here, that is: a) the idea that both systems at the beginning and 
at the end of the transition are in equilibrium (whilst here we explicitly consider that systems – being complex 
configurations – usually are out of the equilibrium); b) the idea that the ending point of the transition is 
somehow known ex-ante (whilst here we explicitly consider that systems usually change in an unpredictable 
way, especially in the case of radical changes). I am aware that scholars of transitions do not indulge at all in 
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cumulative process: innovations in institutions, markets and technologies take place along a 
dominant trajectory; the alignment of such innovations is granted by the incremental 
alteration of the structure and it is sustained by actors that are internal to the system and are 
committed to its survival (Unruh 2000). Things radically change in the case of the creation of 
a new system: new institutions, technologies and markets  must be built; a process of 
extrication is needed to free resources, knowledge, actors, etc., that are locked into dominant 
systems; intentional and unintentional forces that generate their inertia must be overcome; a 
new process of multidimensional alignment must be triggered and made viable (Amendola 
and Gaffard 2006; Foxon 2011). But no structure is available to coordinate all these efforts, 
because the structure itself is created through change; in such a situation, one can even doubt 
if the creation of a new system is possible without the purposeful and increasingly 
coordinated action of enactors committed to change. ST niches may play a relevant role in 
both kinds of dynamics: in the case of adaptation, novelties emerging from niches may be 
incorporated into an existing ST system; in the case of creation, novelties emerging from 
niches contribute to the threats to the existing ST systems and to the establishment of a new 
one. (Schot and Geels 2007) 
A taxonomy of the dynamics of dominant ST systems, in which the role of actors is explicitly 
considered (Geels and Schot 2007), is at centre stage of this framework: ‘transformation’ 
occurs when core-actors gradually adjust a dominant ST systems after pressures coming from 
the macro level or from outsiders, in particular from social groups and grassroots movements; 
‘reconfiguration’ takes place when core-actors are able to respond to external or internal 
pressures by partially changing the structure of the dominant ST system, in particular by 
linking to (or by incorporating) non-core actors and the innovation they developed in one or 
more ST niches; ‘substitution’ is the result of a ‘battle’: actors coming from other ST 
systems, profit from the pressures on the dominant ST system and – after taking over the old 
core-actors – radically change it; ‘de-alignment and re-alignment’ involve enactors – usually 
coming from one or more ST niches – who, whilst the dominant ST system is destabilized by 
major external pressures, experiment radical innovations and eventually establish a new 
dominant ST system. 
Some scholars (Hodson and Marvin 2010; Geels 2011) have recently hinted at the interaction 
between ST systems and space, suggesting that the local/urban level may have three different 
roles in the dynamics of the dominant ST system: 1) local ST systems may co-exist with a 
national/international dominant system (e.g., in the case of urban mobility); 2) ST niches may 
be located at the local/urban level, but then the dynamics of the dominant system takes place 
at the national/international level (e.g., in the case of energy networks); 3) the local/urban 
level is not relevant for the reproduction and change of the dominant ST system (e.g., in the 
case of ICT mass products). 
Examples taken from three alternative scenarios of urban mobility may help to understand the 
above considerations (Marletto 2011b).27 The first scenario (‘Automobility’) is based on the 
reconfiguration of the dominant car system and is generated by the integration of producers 
of batteries, electric engines and new materials, into the global automotive industry; the 
second scenario (‘Electricity’) results from an increasing number of experiments in urban 
niches and generate a substitution process: the (electric) car becomes nothing but an element 
of an energy system whose core-actor is the electric industry; in the third scenario (‘Eco-
                                                                                                                                                        
finalism, but I am also convinced that the concept of creation (of ST systems) wipes out any possible 
misunderstanding. 
27
  For examples taken from the electric sector, see Verbong and Geels (2010). 
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city’) coalitions of urban enactors support the alignment of new and existing elements (that 
is, new urbanism, public transport, bicycles, bike- and car-sharing schemes, electric 
propulsion, etc.): as a result, in several medium and big cities around the world, the car is 
nothing but a residual element of a new ST system of mobility, but the car ST system still 
reproduces itself at a global level. 
 
5. Conclusions and hints for environmental policy 
 
This paper has provided an institutional/evolutionary framework of economic change which 
is based on the dynamics of socio-technical (ST) systems, that is, complex configurations 
which fulfil a societal function (housing, mobility, feeding, etc.).  The functioning of these 
systems is coordinated by the co-evolution of institutional, technological and economic 
constituents and is made possible by adaptive agency.  The issue of power is central to the 
framework: dominant ST systems are actively reproduced and adapted by core-actors and 
generate pervasive lock-ins, whilst new ST systems may emerge as a result of the cumulative 
empowerment of coalitions of enactors.  The creation of new ST systems usually starts in 
protected niches and can not fully deploy without enactors gain a substantial influence on 
politics and policy. 
An institutional/evolutionary approach to environmental policy can draw on the proposed 
framework. As stressed above, dominant ST systems generate pervasive lock-in phenomena. 
Obviously this is also true for high-carbon dominant ST systems for energy provision, 
housing, transportation, industrial production, etc. And this is why no policy for sustainability 
may be envisaged without a prolonged, multidimensional, multi-scale and intentional effort 
aimed at overcoming all lock-ins into unsustainable ST systems. This implies that a policy for 
sustainability must have a dual nature: it must be de-constructive, that is, aimed at unlocking 
existing ST systems and constructive, that is, aimed at creating new – and more sustainable – 
ST systems. The verb 'create' is not used by chance: a sustainable economy will only emerge 
from the self-reinforcing alignment of several structural changes, that gradually give rise to a 
stable and powerful configuration of actors, institutions, technologies and markets, that is, to 
a new and more sustainable ST system. 
It is apparent that this is not an easy task for policy: first of all because both the unlocking of 
the old and the creation of the new must be played on all the institutional, technological and 
economic dimensions of change; secondly, because approaches to change may need to be 
tailored to different local and supra-local levels; and finally because actors must be both the 
object and the subject of an intentional action for change: as acknowledged by many scholars, 
the building of a coalition for change should be one of the objectives of a policy for 
sustainability. Inter alia, this is why ST niches are also essential to gradually build up – and 
legitimize – coalitions of actors, who share new rules, interpretive frames and visions, and 
advocate all changes needed to create more sustainable ST systems. 
But here we have a ‘chicken and egg’ problem; more precisely we have a problem of 'actors 
for change and policy for change': who comes first? The school of transition management 
implicitly suggests that they must be built simultaneously through reflexive governance and 
societal learning (Loorbach 2007; Foxon et al. 2009; Nill and Kemp 2009; Voss et al. 2009). 
Other scholars stress that change is usually triggered by actors who foster social, institutional, 
technological and economic innovations (Genus and Coles 2008; Bergek 2008b; Foxon 
2011); in particular, Brown and Vergragt (2008) stress the role of grassroots movements. 
Others suggest that the answer should be researched in the political dimension of change 
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(Smith et al. 2005; Frantzeskaki and de Haan 2009; Meadowcroft 2011). Further analysis is 
needed to get a better understanding of this point which is crucial for the design and 
implementation of effective policies for sustainability. The in-depth study of national and 
local success stories may be a fruitful research path.28 
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